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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
Amici are law professors engaged in study of the
admiralty and maritime law of the United States.
They have published extensively about it, and currently teach or have spent their professional careers
teaching, about it.

The only interest of amici is in optimal development of the body of U.S. law that governs in cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Indeed, we
differ on how various questions concerning the maritime law of punitive damages in this case should be
answered in general and how those answers should
be applied to the award in this case.
We agree, however, that answers of some kind
are overdue. Moreover, we agree on the approach that
a court should take in formulating the maritime law
of the United States and on the sources to which such
a court might look in the process. We therefore file
this amicus brief to assist the Court in its resolution
of this significant case.

--------·-------1

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in
part. No person or entity, other than the Maritime Law Institute
of Tulane University, which paid for the printing of this brief,
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission
of this brief. This brief is filed with the written consent of the
parties, reflected in letters on file with the Clerk.
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ARGUMENT
The petition should be granted to resolve
critical questions of national importance
regarding whether and under what circumstances federal maritime law allows punitive
damages.
In this case, the Ninth Circuit has reviewed at
length the award of punitive damages for conformity
with this Court's interpretation of the Constitution's
guarantee of due process, but its attention to this
constitutional question appears to have distracted it
from pronouncing federal maritime law. More attention to questions about the general maritime law of
punitive damages might have made constitutional
rev1ew unnecessary.

A. This is a maritime case governed by federal maritime law.
This is a case of harm to the livelihoods of commercial and subsistence fishermen caused by a spill
of crude oil from a tank vessel stranded on a reef in
Prince William Sound, part of the "navigable waters
of the United States" opening to the Gulf of Alaska. A
federal jury found that the stranding was caused by
negligent navigation and that Exxon, the shipowner,
was liable for income unrealized as a consequence of
days lost to fishing and distress to the fish stocks of the
Sound. Compensatory damages were awarded. Other
cases, brought on behalf of the State of Alaska and the
United States, raised issues of Exxon's liability for
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damages to the environment and natural resources;
they were settled. This case was not settled but tried,
and because Exxon has not appealed from the judgment that it was liable to these plaintiffs for compensatory damages, the most important matters still in
dispute are whether punitive damages are also appropriate, and if so, how much. These are matters to
be governed by federal maritime law.
The casualty that gives rise to this case, a vessel's stranding, was maritime, as are the alleged
torts, so this case is subject to federal judicial power
pursuant to Article III, Section 2, as a case "of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." (Contrary to the
general preference for an interpretation of the words
of the Constitution that leaves none of them redundant, it is well settled that "admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction" does not describe two sets of cases, but
one. In this brief, "admiralty" will ordinarily be used
with reference to a federal court with the power to
hear cases of this sort, and "maritime" will be used
with reference to the body of law applied in such
cases.) See generally Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995) (clarifying the requirements for admiralty tort jurisdiction); Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990) (same).
In section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress vested the federal district courts with jurisdiction to hear "cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction." 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789). At the same
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time, under the so-called Saving to Suitors Clause,
Congress authorized state courts 2 to continue hearing
some of the cases, that is, those for which the common law (as distinct from maritime law) also provided a remedy. Id. at 77. This scheme, by which
federal district courts are authorized to hear any case
within admiralty jurisdiction and to implement
certain remedies exclusive to maritime law, while
state courts are authorized to hear those cases otherwise within admiralty jurisdiction that are suited for
ordinary remedies, is preserved in 28 U.S.C. § 1333
(2000).
Because this case is within admiralty jurisdiction, it is presumptively governed by federal law, not
state law. Yamaha Motor Corp. USA v. Calhoun, 516
U.S. 199, 206 (1996); East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986). As the
parties have acknowledged and the courts below
agreed, the governing federal law is maritime law,
which is made not only in treaties, Acts of Congress,
2

Under the same theory that permits state courts sitting at
common law to hear maritime cases, the Saving to Suitors
Clause also permits federal courts sitting on "the law side" (i.e.,
exercising jurisdiction on some basis other than admiralty) to
hear maritime cases. See, e.g., Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 376-77 (1959) (explaining that federal
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction could hear maritime
cases under the Saving to Suitors Clause in the same way that
state courts did). Indeed, the district court in this case was
sitting on "the law side," which explains why there was a jury
verdict in a maritime case when admiralty courts do not generally have juries.
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and federal regulations, but also in the decisions of
courts, both state and federal. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co.
v. James N. Kirby Pty, Ltd., 543 U.S. 14, 23 (2004)
("Because the grant of admiralty jurisdiction and the
power to make admiralty law are mutually dependent, the two are often intertwined in our cases.")
'When maritime law is made by judges in case decisions, it is made in a manner similar to that for
making common law, and such judge-made law is
commonly referred to as "general" maritime law cto
distinguish it from law made otherwise, that is, in
treaties, statutes, and regulations). East River S.S.
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
864-65 (1986) ("Drawn from state and federal sources,
the general maritime law is an amalgam of traditional common law rules, modifications of those rules,
and newly created rules."). See Robert Force, Admiralty and Maritime Law 21 (2004); Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law§ 5-1 (4th
ed. 2004); David J. Sharpe, Admiralty Jurisdiction:
The Power over Cases, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 1149·(2005). As
substantive law made sometimes by federal judges,
general maritime law survived Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

B. The Ninth Circuit neglected its obligation
to articulate the federal maritime law requirements for punitive damages.
The body of our maritime law falls short of a
comprehensive code. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 216 (1986). Certain aspects of the
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general maritime law have been greatly refined by
Congress and the courts, while others have not - at
least not yet. The law of punitive damages is one of
those aspects that have yet to be refined, and this
case is pregnant with such unresolved issues.
That the general maritime law of the United
States empowers courts to award punitive damages
in maritime cases was suggested by this Court as
early as 1818, in The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. (16
U.S.) 546, and confirmed in dicta in 1893, in Lake
Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 10809. Lower courts have generally proceeded on the
basis that they are so empowered. See, e.g., CEH, Inc.
v. FN Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 699 (1st Cir. 1995);
Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain
Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1379, 1387 (9th Cir. 1985); In
re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89, 105 (2d Cir.
1972). See generally David W. Robertson, Punitive
Damages in American Maritime Law, 28 J. Mar. L. &
Com. 73 (1997).
Nevertheless, as the Fifth Circuit has observed,
that the general maritime law empowers courts to
award punitive damages has not yet formed the basis
for a holding by this Court. See Galveston County
Navigation Dist. No. 1 v. Hopson Towing Co., 92 F.3d
353, 359 n.ll (5th Cir. 1996); see also In re Diamond
B Marine Serv., Inc., Nos. 99-951 & 99-984, 2000 WL
222847 (E.D. La. Feb. 23, 2000). In certain maritime
cases permitted by the Saving to Suitors Clause, 28
U.S.C. § 1333, state courts also apply federal maritime law. Courts of Louisiana have expressed doubt
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lately that federal maritime law authorizes punitive
damages in any case. See, e.g., Boucvalt v. Sea Trac
Offshore Serv., Inc., 943 So. 2d 1204, 1207-08 (La.
App. 2006). We think it therefore fair to say that a
rule of federal maritime law allowing punitive damages has yet to be "judicially established as part of
the body of federal admiralty law in this country."
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S.
310, 316 (1955).
Even in those federal circuits where it has been
assumed that federal maritime law allows for punitive damages in some cases, it is not agreed that a
shipowner-employer can be liable vicariously for
punitive damages when those misbehaving are employed as a vessel's crew or her captain. Borrowing
from the , the First and Ninth Circuits appear to
agree that punitive damages against a shipowner are
warranted by federal maritime law for qualifying
misbehavior on the part of a ship's captain because of
the managerial nature of that position. See Seafarer,
70 F.3d at 704-05; Protectus Alpha, 767 F.2d at 138587. Citing to an American treatise, the Seventh
Circuit in 1896 found the general rule of maritime
law to be that "the owners of a vessel are liable for all
injuries caused by the misconduct, negligence, or
unskillfulness of the master, provided the act be done
while acting within the scope of his authority as
master." The State of Missouri, 76 F. 376, 379 (7th
Cir. 1896) (citing 2 Theophilus Parsons, A Treatise on
the Law of Shipping 26 (1869)). On the other hand,
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the Fifth and Sixth Circuits enforce a strict complicity rule traceable to The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. at
558-59, and Lake Shore, 147 U.S. at 108-09. See In re
P & E Boat Rentals, Inc., 872 F.2d 642, 650-52 (5th
Cir. 1989); United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407
F.2d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1969).
Regarding at least two other unsettled but pertinent issues of the general maritime law of punitive
damages, the Ninth Circuit neglected in this case
even to say what the law is. To Exxon's argument
that federal maritime law should not allow punitive
damages when punishment and deterrence are otherwise assured, the Ninth Circuit replied only that:
Exxon's argument has some force as logic
and policy. But it has no force, in the absence
of precedent, to establish that the law, or the
Constitution, bars punitive damages in these
circumstances. Because we have not been
made aware of a principle of law pursuant to
which we should strike a punitive damages
award on the ground that the conduct had
already been sufficiently punished and deterred, we reject the argument.
In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1226 (9th Cir.
2001), reprinted at Pet. App. 68a.

The proposition that federal maritime law could be
drawn from a principle that limits punitive damages
when sufficient deterrence and punishment is otherwise assured is at least suggested in Thyssen, Inc. v.
S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57 (1985), where the
Second Circuit, per Judge Friendly, reversed an
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award of punitive damages against the time charterer
of a vessel for improper stowage ("deviation") said to
be by order of the master or the chief mate in part
because
the deterring effect of punitive damages is severely diluted when the actors are employees
not of the person held liable but of another
whom he has hired to perform his tasks. And,
as pointed out above, the argument for straining to award punitive damages is particularly
weak in the case of deviation where heavy
sanctions exist in any event."

I d. at 68.
Likewise, to Exxon's argument that the maritime
law should require evidence of recklessness that is
clear and convincing, the Ninth Circuit answered
only that a lower standard was constitutionally
permissible and, in the absence of established precedent particular to maritime law, the standard of proof
generally applied in federal civil cases should apply.
Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1232-33, reprinted at Pet.
App. 79a-80a. In Alaska, state law calls for clear and
convincing evidence of misconduct qualifying for
punitive damages. Alaska Stat. Ann. § 09.17.020
(2006). The Ninth Circuit appears to have begged the
question about maritime law by defaulting to what it
describes as the standard generally applied in federal
civil cases.
A bedrock assumption underpinning federal
maritime law is that the constitutional grant of
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jurisdiction and law making was intended to foster
uniformity and consistency for the benefit of maritime commerce. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. James N. Kirby
Pty, Ltd., 543 U.S. 14, 28-29 (2004); American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 451 (1994) (quoting
The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 558, 575 (1875));
see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731,
738-39 (1961); see Schoenbaum, supra, § 4-1. 3

C. In formulating the general maritime law,
this Court can look to a wide variety of different sources.
As amici we do not suggest the proper source
from which to draw the maritime law for punitive
damages. In the past, this Court has tapped various
sources for a rule that best serves the policy that
ought to control under the circumstances. Rules
prevailing in the codes of the maritime nations of
3

But this Court has observed that the requirement for
uniform maritime law is not absolute, American Dredging, 510
U.S. at 451, and, under certain circumstances, has allowed
resort to state law when no rule of federal maritime law has
been established, so long as it would not "work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or
interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in
its international and interstate relations." I d. at 44 7; see also
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996) (damages
available for the wrongful death of a non-seafarer is an issue
maritime but local so that state law could be applied); see
generally Schoenbaum, supra, § 4-2. Here, the pressing question
however is not whether state law will suffice, but where to turn
for content when making federal maritime law instead.
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Europe and approved by that continent's leading
jurists have long proved persuasive. See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. (78 U.S.) 1, 23-24 (1870)
aff'g De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass.
1815) (No. 3,776) (Story, J.); Columbian Ins. Co. of
Alexandria v. Ashby & Stribling, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.)
331, 342 (1839).
More recently, this Court has derived one rule of
general maritime law with reference to a consensus
among the world's maritime nations and the views of
respected scholars and judges. See McDermott, Inc. v.
Amclyde, 511 U.S. 202, 208 (1994) (recalling United
States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975)).
Persuaded by considerations of judicial economy, the
promotion of settlement, and consistency with existing federal maritime law, in Amclyde it drew another
from the Restatement (Second) of Torts. I d. at 211. It
has chosen a third consistent with the law in other
common law countries, scholarly advice, and the
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws.
Wherever it has looked for inspiration when
fashioning maritime law in rules of decision, this
Court has taken care to harmonize its work with that
of Congress. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S.
19, 31-32 (1990); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436
U.S. 618, 625-26 (1978); The Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972); Moragne v. Central
Gulf Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 397-99 (1970). See generally
Force, supra, 20-21; Schoenbaum, supra, §§ 4-1,4-2.
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With due regard therefore for the manifest interest of Congress, this Court enjoys a range of sources
and broad discretion in fashioning as general maritime law the rules of punitive damages that best
serve the policy that ought to control under the
circumstances.

--------·-------CONCLUSION
The petition should be granted to resolve uncertainty about critical aspects of the federal maritime
law of punitive damages.
Respectfully Submitted,
Jmm PAUL JoNES
Counsel of Record
28 Westhampton Way
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND

Richmond, Virginia 23173
(804) 289-8211
Counsel for Amici Curiae

